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Abstract. In this paper we explore the capacity of political 
parties to contest general elections by examining the pat-
terns of candidate spending in individual electoral districts. 
The data allows us to compare and assess differences across 
national political parties, over time (including both third and 
post-third party system periods), and during different elec-
toral finance regimes. 
 











Résumé. Dans cet article, nous explorons la capacité des 
partis politiques à contester les élections générales, en exa-
minant les caractéristiques des dépenses des candidats dans 
des circonscriptions électorales particulières. Les données 
nous permettent de comparer et d’évaluer les différences 
entre partis politiques nationaux, au cours d’une période 
donnée (en incluant les périodes de système de tiers et pos-
système de tiers), et durant différents régimes financiers 
électoraux. 
 








Single-member plurality electoral systems highlight and 
often privilege the local dimension of electoral competition 
by forcing political parties to nominate and campaign for 
candidates on a district-by-district basis.  In this paper we 
seek to measure and assess the place of local electoral dis-
trict campaigns in Canadian national general elections to 
consider how, if at all, they have altered in recent decades in 
the face of a transformation in the structure of the party 
system and a rewriting of election and party finance legisla-
tion. By mapping the capacity of partisan campaign strength 
in the country’s individual local electoral districts we explore 
the immediate face of party competition experienced by 
voters as they come to mark their ballots. 
We begin by framing the organizational character of par-
ty competition in Canada and the party system(s) that it has 
spawned. In managing their campaign activities the political 
parties are constrained by political finance regimes con-
structed by parliament. This requires we also consider how 
election and party finance law shapes the local-national 
balance in the parties’ campaign efforts. Having set these 
frames, we utilize public accounts of party candidates’ elec-
tion spending to explore the strength and patterns of con-
stituency level campaigning in Canada over the last three 
decades. This will allow us to ask how, if at all, significant 
changes to both the party system and election law are alter-
ing the place of local campaigning.  
 
Elections and Party Organization in Canada 
 
Elections in Canada are simultaneously national, regional 
and local events. These three dimensions are all reflected in 
the organization of the political parties that structure the 
country’s political competition. As is the case in most con-
temporary democracies, Canada’s politics are highly nation-
alized. For well over half a century, an extensive mass media 
has allowed Canadian party leaders to make direct appeals to 
the national electorate at election time. Party leaders are the 
public face of their party, and the national election is in some 
respects synonymous with the various parties’ leaders’ tours 
crisscrossing the country to enact staged media-oriented 
events. Televised debates between the party leaders – gener-
ally one in each of the country’s two official languages – are 
key turning points in the trajectory of the national campaign, 
and defining events for the national election.   
It is, however, a misnomer to talk about “the” national 
campaign in the Canadian context. In reality, each Canadian 
general election encompasses two national elections: one in 
its English, the other in its French-speaking areas. These 
campaigns progress largely in parallel with one another, 
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intersecting only periodically. Each of these sub-national 
elections has its own narrative, as parties develop different 
messages to deliver to each electorate, often emphasizing 
different issues and pursuing different themes.  Although 
both the English and French leaders’ debates are broadcast 
across the country, their impact is generally limited to the 
electorate sharing the language of the debate.  
As a geographically vast country comprised of regions 
with distinctive identities, economic interests and historical 
relationships to the national government, Canada’s politics 
are characterized by regional patterns of voting and political 
support that go beyond this simple linguistic divide. Quebec, 
with its majority francophone population, exists as a distinc-
tive political region, as do the Atlantic provinces and the 
Western provinces. As the most populous province and the 
industrial engine of the national economy, Ontario has his-
torically been characterized as defining the national interest, 
but it too is increasingly coming to be seen as a distinctive 
political region. These regions are not themselves fully cohe-
sive entities, but ongoing differences in their broad voting 
patterns and the character of their political representation 
continue to shape the considerations structuring the parties’ 
general political strategy and electoral activity.  
While national and regional/provincial politics dominate 
popular conceptions of Canadian election, and play an im-
portant role in structuring both the debate and the outcome 
of elections, the legal and practical reality is that a Canadian 
general election is comprised of (currently) 308 distinctive 
contests occurring in individual electoral districts, each of 
which elects a Member of Parliament. Survey based analyses 
suggest that while about two-fifths of the electorate have 
preferences for one local candidate that preference was the 
decisive factor for only five per cent of Canadian voters  
(Blais et. al. 2002).  
 These modest proportions should not be taken to mean 
that local campaigns are largely irrelevant to electoral out-
comes. In their analysis of the 1993, 1997 and 2000 elec-
tions, Carty and Eagles (2005: 133) demonstrated that “even 
after discounting for pre-existing popularity, candidates’ 
local campaign spending makes a difference to their electoral 
success.” Similarly, Coletto (2010: 216), examining the 2004, 
2006 and 2008 federal elections, found evidence that ‘quali-
ty’ challengers – those with prior political experience or a 
high profile occupation – won a somewhat higher proportion 
of the vote share than did similarly placed candidates with-
out these background assets. His findings confirmed earlier 
analyses showing that candidate spending had a small, but 
discernible, positive impact on vote share. Thus, although 
local campaigns may have less influence on voters’ choices 
than their national counterparts, they nonetheless play a role 
in shaping electoral outcomes.  Carty and Eagles (2005: 175) 
conclude that there is “strong evidence that local political 
actors are far from passive or powerless in the face of cen-
tralizing and homogenizing influences. Instead, drawing on 
resources available to them, political actors have constructed 
a party politics that is firmly anchored in their local commu-
nities.” 
Canadian party organization is best described as ‘stratar-
chical’ in that the national and local parties enjoy considera-
ble mutual autonomy. Canadian parties have long opera-
tionalized this in an implicit organizational bargain which 
allows local electoral district party associations autonomy in 
selecting candidates and running local election campaigns 
while the national party enjoys autonomy in determining 
party policy at the national level and managing a leader-
focused electoral campaign (Carty 2002; Carty & Cross 
2010). Carty characterizes this stratarchical relationship as 
analogous to a franchise arrangement, with parties’ central 
organizations “providing the basic product line (policy and 
leadership), … devising and directing the major communica-
tion line (the national campaign) and … establishing stand-
ard organizational management. … Local units …provide the 
basic organizational home of most party members and are 
typically charged with delivering the product, i.e. creating 
organizations that can find and support candidates as well as 
mobilizing campaigns to deliver the vote on the ground” 
(Carty 2004: 11).   
Consistent with this model, the selection of candidates 
for Canadian parties remains primarily the prerogative of the 
local party association, although there is evidence of national 
party intervention in a number of individual cases in recent 
elections (Cross 2006).  The selection of the candidate is a 
significant process and decision, not only because a winning 
candidate will sit in the party’s caucus in Parliament, but 
also because the candidate’s own organization becomes, in 
many instances, the local campaign organization for the 
purpose of the election. The candidate, rather than the party 
organization, appoints the campaign manager and he or she 
is the focus for attracting campaign personnel and volun-
teers as well as being central to the local campaign’s ability 
to raise the necessary finds to fight the election (Carty 1991; 
Coletto 2010). With the national campaign providing little in 
the way of material support, local campaigns reflect the 
varied imperatives of the communities in which they are 
rooted (Carty, et. al. 2000, ch 8; Carty & Eagles 2005). 
There is some evidence that this is changing in some parties. 
Coletto et. al. (2011) examine patterns of fundraising by and 
transfers within Canadian political party organizations, and 
find evidence that both the NDP and, to an even greater 
extent, the Bloc are moving toward a situation in which local 
campaigns are partially or even almost entirely bankrolled 
by the central party organization. For both the Liberals and 
Conservatives, however, this is not the case. Local candidates 
and local parties remain largely autonomous in raising the 
funds needed to mount local campaign efforts. 
 
The Canadian Party System 
 
The Canadian party system has been considerably altered 
over recent decades. From the mid-1960s until 1993, three 
political parties – the Liberal Party, the Progressive Con-
servative Party and the New Democratic Party – dominated 
Canadian politics. Each of these three parties strove to be 
“pan-Canadian,” by dedicating themselves to creating a 
national community, both in the content of their messaging 
and their policy agendas, but also by presenting “consistent 
and coherent messages to voters in all corners of the coun-
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try” (Carty et. al. 2000, 21).  All parties claimed a national 
status by running candidates in every electoral district across 
the country, even in regions and communities where they 
had (or even expected) little electoral support. Although the 
three parties adopted differing stances on various public 
policy questions, they were united in their focus on the crea-
tion and protection of a national political community, par-
ticularly in the face of disintegrative forces, most notably the 
election of governments in the province of Quebec dedicated 
to pursuing that province’s separation from the rest of the 
country.  
Although parties consciously articulated pan-Canadian 
appeals during this era, distinct patterns of regional support 
were nonetheless very evident. The Liberal Party, which held 
office for much of this period, had strong support in Central 
Canada (Ontario and Quebec) as well as the Atlantic prov-
inces, but enjoyed limited electoral success in the Western 
provinces. The Progressive Conservative party was generally 
strong in the West and parts of Ontario and Atlantic Canada, 
but weak in Quebec. This pattern was disrupted in 1984, 
when the Progressive Conservatives, led by a fluently bilin-
gual Quebec leader, Brian Mulroney, constructed a broad 
new national coalition that allowed them to win governing 
majorities in two successive general elections. For its part, 
the NDP enjoyed pockets of support in Ontario, as well as 
across parts of the Western provinces, but it was never able 
to break through to win seats in Quebec.  
That pan-Canadian party system collapsed in 1993, when 
the governing Progressive Conservatives were reduced from 
a majority government with one hundred and sixty nine 
seats to a rump with only two seats in the House of Com-
mons. This followed a period of intensive constitutional 
politics, in which the Conservative government tried to 
amend the Canadian constitution in a number of significant 
ways, including a provision that would have recognized 
Quebec as a distinct society. Although all three of the major 
parties had backed the proposed constitutional compromise 
–the Charlottetown Accord– a majority of voters rejected it 
in a national referendum in 1992. Constitutional politics 
proved to be the Achilles heel of the Mulroney Conservatives’ 
electoral coalition: much of the party’s traditional base in 
Western Canada defected to the new right populist Reform 
Party while many of its recently acquired Quebec supporters 
moved to support the new sovereigntist Bloc Quebecois. The 
1993 electoral earthquake left the Liberal Party in govern-
ment, holding seats in urban centers across the country, 
while monopolizing Ontario and federalist areas of Quebec. 
The NDP lost most of its seats, as many of its Western voters 
defected to Reform, leaving the party much reduced in its 
seat count. This electoral fragmentation marked the end of 
the third party system and launched a period of instability in 
Canadian politics. Five parties were represented in the 
House of Commons with the Liberals left to form governing 
majorities on a historically low base of national support.  
The combination of a fractured opposition and a solid re-
gional base in Ontario and parts of Quebec produced Liberal 
majority governments 1993 to 2004 but the party’s precari-
ous dominance was challenged when a renewed Conserva-
tive Party of Canada (CPC - a product of a merger between 
the Reform/Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Con-
servative remnants) made significant electoral inroads into 
Ontario, reducing it to a minority. The Conservatives were 
then able to supplant the Liberals and form minority gov-
ernments of their own after elections in 2006 and 2008. The 
CPC’s regional base of support includes much of Western 
Canada, parts of suburban and rural Ontario, parts of Atlan-
tic Canada, and a small number of seats in Quebec. The 
series of successive minority electoral outcomes (2004, 
2006, 2008) was, in large part, a function of the continued 
strength of the Bloc Quebecois. The Bloc’s continued ability 
to capture up to 50 of Quebec’s 75 seats in the 308 seat 
House of Commons, and its ideological unacceptability as a 
coalition partner, made it exceedingly difficult for any other 
party to form a majority government.  
 
The Regulation of Political Finance 
 
The period covered in this paper spans two distinct regulato-
ry regimes governing election finance. The first extended 
from 1974 to 2003; the second the three general elections 
from 2004. The 1974 election finance regime was established 
during a period when national parties were only just becom-
ing recognized in Canadian election law (Courtney 1978). 
Prior to this, the regulation of elections focused solely on 
local campaigns on the historic principle that national elec-
tions consisted simply of a set of local contests that elected 
individual members of parliament. The 1974 amendments to 
the Canada Elections Act were notable in their recognition 
of national political parties and their campaigns, yet still 
focused heavily on local contests as the primary site of elec-
toral competition (Carty & Young 2012).  
The 1974 regime contained three key elements: it re-
quired that national parties and candidates disclose the size 
and source of their financial contributions (but did not place 
limits on either), it established spending limits for both 
national parties and candidates during the campaign period, 
and it introduced public funding for candidates and political 
parties both directly through the reimbursement of election 
expenses, and indirectly through a tax credit available to 
donors.   
The legislated spending limits for both national parties 
and candidates warrant particular attention as they repre-
sented the parties’ (operating through their parliamentari-
ans) definition of the appropriate balance between national 
and local campaigning. The (indexed to inflation) limits for 
national parties were initially set at $0.30 per elector in each 
electoral district in which the party was running a candidate. 
Spending limits for individual candidates were calculated 
according to a formula based on the number of eligible elec-
tors in the district, with the geographic size and accessibility 
of the district also taken into account.  
The direct form of public financial support for parties 
and candidates comprised reimbursement of a portion of 
their election expenses. Starting in 1974, parties were reim-
bursed for 50 per cent of their election expenditures on 
television and radio advertising. In 1983, Parliament 
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amended the legislation to reimburse parties for 22.5 per 
cent of their total election expenses, provided that the party 
had spent at least 10 per cent of its legal limit. In 1996, Par-
liament again amended the legislation to require that a party 
receive either 2 per cent of the valid votes cast nationally or 
at least 5 per cent of the votes case in the electoral districts 
where it ran candidates to be eligible for the reimbursement 
(Young 2004: 446).  
Candidates’ eligibility for reimbursement is determined 
ex post facto as a consequence of the electoral support they 
receive. The 1974 legislation required that a candidate win at 
least 15 per cent of the vote to be subsequently eligible for 
election expenses reimbursements. The reimbursement 
formula was originally tied to the number of eligible electors 
in the district, but was later set at 50 per cent of the candi-
date’s expenditures.  
In 2003 Parliament adopted legislation establishing a 
new regime governing election finance. In this reformed 
system both the spending limits and the reimbursements of 
election expenses were left intact. Candidates continue to be 
reimbursed 50 per cent of their election expenditures, but 
the eligibility threshold was dropped from 15 per cent of the 
vote to 10 per cent, thereby expanding the pool of candidates 
receiving reimbursements. Parties’ election expenses reim-
bursements were increased from 22.5 per cent to 50 percent, 
thereby considerably reducing the cost to the parties them-
selves of mounting national election campaigns.  
The most significant elements of the 2003 legislation 
were limits on both the size and source of contributions, and 
introduction of direct funding to national political parties 
outside of election periods. This legislation allowed only 
individual contributions to national political parties, to a 
maximum of $5000 per donor per party each year. Contri-
butions from corporations, unions or other organizations 
were permitted only at the local level (to local party associa-
tions and candidates), to a maximum of $1000 per donor 
per local association or candidate each year. In 2006, further 
legislative changes limited contributions at all levels to indi-
vidual donors, effectively banning all corporate or union 
contributions, and reduced the maximum allowable contri-
bution from $5000 to $1000.  
To replace the income lost from union and corporate 
contributions, the legislation introduced a quarterly allow-
ance for registered political parties that had won either 2 per 
cent of the valid votes cast nationally or at least 5 per cent of 
the votes cast in the electoral districts where it ran candi-
dates. Eligible parties were to receive $1.75 (with provisions 
for inflation adjustments) annually for each vote won in the 
most recent federal election.  
 
The Local-National Balance 
 
In this paper, we use election spending as a measure of the 
strength of local and national party electoral campaign or-
ganizations from 1979 through 2008. The data is taken from 
the official reports to the Chief Electoral Officer that the law 
requires of both individual candidates and recognized politi-
cal parties. Some care is required in interpreting campaign 
spending in the Canadian context. First, as noted above, 
candidates must abide by legislated spending limits during 
the official campaign period, so there is a cap at the upper 
end of the range of spending. There is, nonetheless, substan-
tial variation in candidate spending, with some campaigns 
spending only a fraction of their legislated limit and others 
spending virtually every penny they are allowed.  
Second, we rely on reports of spending during the official 
election campaign, a period that varied considerably during 
the elections covered by our study (from a low of 36 days in 
1997 to a high of to 66 days in 1980) and we have no account 
of spending prior to the campaign period. There is every 
reason to believe that candidates who spent close to 100 per 
cent of their legislated limit might well have spent money on 
campaigning in the weeks and months leading up to the 
election call, an amount that likely differed from election to 
election given the disparate campaign periods. As there is no 
requirement that this be reported we have no measure of 
spending outside the writ period.  
Third, the local campaigns are, for the most part, inde-
pendent of the national party organizations both in fundrais-
ing and in the financial conduct of their local campaigns. 
Coletto et. al.  (2011) measured net flows between local 
associations and candidates, on the one hand, and national 
parties, on the other. They found that between 2004 and 
2007, transfers down from the national party equaled 23 per 
cent of the total income raised locally for the Liberal party, 
31 per cent for the Conservative party, 49 per cent for the 
NDP, and 80 per cent for the Bloc. Much of that movement 
occurred in Quebec where the Conservative party is particu-
larly weak and the Bloc heavily reliant on the state subsidy. 
Those are, however, aggregate figures and it may simply be 
that national parties were transferring funds to particular 
candidates in an effort to target marginal seats, a pattern 
that Pattie and Johnston (2009) identified in their analysis 
of local campaigns in Britain.  
Various sets of societal, political and institutional chang-
es over the three and a half decade span of this study had the 
potential to affect the relative local-national balance, some 
toward the national level and others toward the local.  Sever-
al factors predict that national campaigns should become 
more important than their local counterparts. Perhaps most 
compelling, are the array of forces that have shifted politics 
from a predominantly local to a largely national (or bi-
national) phenomenon over the past century. The emergence 
of mass media, national television networks and news agen-
cies, the advent of opinion polling and the nationalization of 
the Canadian political community that was the focus of the 
pan-Canadian party system all contribute to a nationaliza-
tion of election campaigns. These forces lend themselves 
toward what Norris (2000) refers to as the ‘modern’ nation-
alized campaign.  This argument implies that throughout the 
pan-Canadian period (to 1993) there would have been a 
downward movement in the ratio of local to national cam-
paign spending.  
Several elements of the 2004 reforms to the election fi-
nance regime also push in the direction of greater centraliza-
tion of campaign expenditures.  Increases in public funding 
are delivered almost exclusively into the hands of the na-
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tional political parties: it is the national parties that receive 
the annual allowance of (now) $2 per vote won.  Although 
candidates were also faced with the same loss of corporate 
and union revenue as the national party organizations they 
did not receive any additional public money to replace it. As 
a consequence, Liberal and Conservative candidates’ total 
revenues declined from approximately $18 million (each) in 
2000, to just over $8 million in 2004 (Coletto et. al. 2011, 
figure 14).  Compounding this centralizing thrust, the elec-
tion expenses reimbursement was enriched from 22.5% to 
50% for national parties, meaning that national parties were 
able to join candidates in spending fifty-cent dollars in their 
campaign efforts.  
There are, however, other reasons to anticipate a degree 
of localization in campaign expenditures.  As mass media 
become more fragmented and it becomes more difficult to 
reach the public via these channels, parties may come to rely 
more heavily on targeted local appeals, in what Norris 
(2000) refers to as the ‘post-modern’ campaign.  Moreover, 
as detailed data about the geographic location of various 
targeted segments of the electorate become available to 
parties, they are better able to identify key electoral districts 
on which to focus their efforts.  
As the party system has shifted from its pan-Canadian 
national focus to a more regionalized politics, the national 
campaign may have declined in importance leading parties 
to focus their efforts on areas of the country where they are 
electorally competitive. If this was the case, we should not 
necessarily expect to see a decline in national relative to local 
spending. Rather, we would anticipate a greater degree of 
variation within parties in the intensity of their campaign 
efforts in various regions. The peculiarities of the new na-
tional party system Canada entered into in the first decade of 
the 21st century seem to point toward greater local effort, at 
least in key electoral districts. With the emergence of a ‘per-
manent campaign’ (Flanagan 2010), national elections are 
intensely contested and the resources amassed often exceed 
what can be legally spent at the national level. As a result 
some spill over to the local level in targeted ridings.  With 
the electoral calculus governed by the need to create at best a 
marginal majority of seats (because of the Bloc’s removal of 
so many seats from play), the focus shifts to intense competi-
tion in a relatively small number of seats. This speaks more 
to the degree of variation found within parties rather than to 
the local-national ratio.  
 
Local Spending in National Elections 
 
The story of the place and impact of local campaigns in 
Canadian general elections inevitably reflects the considera-
ble variation – social, economic and political – that charac-
terizes the country’s (regularly shifting and growing number 
of) electoral districts. And given the considerable autonomy 
traditionally accorded to local associations’ campaigns by the 
franchise model utilized by the county’s political parties, one 
might assume that any common theme is overwhelmed by 
the dynamics of local idiosyncrasy. However, using the local 
candidate’s election spending as a common metric allows us 
to provide a portrait that reveals the changing impact of local 
campaigns in national electoral contests.  
Election expense limits and disclosure regulations have 
now been in place for over three decades, spanning the last 
ten general elections. Although the nominal spending limits 
have grown by about 3.4 times in that period the change has 
merely accounted for inflation – the real limits have changed 
hardly at all. But this apparent stability masks an important 
shift in the local-national balance in favour of the national 
party over its candidates. In 1979, a full slate of party candi-
dates was entitled to spend 1.74 times as much as the na-
tional party campaign on election expenses, by 2008 that 
ratio had shrunk to 1.35. This slow but persistent shift sig-
nals a public acceptance that it is the national campaign that 
increasingly drives partisan efforts. 
This ratio of legislated limits for a party’s candidates and 
national campaign constitutes parliament’s definition of the 
appropriate local-national balance. In fact no party’s cam-
paign ever reflects that balance. As Figure 1 illustrates, the 
parties typically invest less in their local campaigns (taken as 
a whole) than the law would allow. For the most part this is 
because they do not come close to spending their allowable 
limit in many of the electoral districts. That noted, the figure 
also indicates that, over the period, it was the Liberals who 
generally came closest to the nationally defined ratio. This is 
local evidence of their standing as the most national of the 
parties over the period. The Conservatives did manage to 
displace the Liberals from office in the 1980s, and again in 
2006 and the figure suggests they did so by running stronger 
local campaigns.  
 
Figure 1. Local Candidate : National Party Spending Limits 
 
 
While a minor party like the New Democrats can run effec-
tive national campaigns they have, at best, only a nominal 
presence in many electoral districts and so their local-
national balance is skewed away from the norm. By contrast, 
new parties attempting to break into the system may take on 
a quite different pattern as the Reform party and the Bloc 
Quebecois did in their early years. As grassroots movements 
they were able to mount substantial local campaigns before 
their central organizations had the capacity to conduct 
equivalent campaigns. With their incorporation into the 
system as regular players they soon take on the more charac-
teristic patterns of established political parties. 
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If the inability of a party’s candidates to spend to their 
limit is at the heart of this pattern, the long-term decline in 
the local-national campaign effort also reflects a similar 
general decline in the capacity of local candidates to mount 
full campaigns (Figure 2). The figure also confirms that the 
average candidate in a winning party (the Liberals in 1979, 
1980, 1997, 2000 & 2004; the Progressive Conservatives in 
1984, 1988 and the Conservatives in 2006, 2008) spends 
more than the candidates in the other parties reinforcing a 
perception that national electoral victories are rooted in 
broad and strong local campaigns.  
 
Figure 2. Average Candidate Spending as % of Local Limit 
             
Average local spending among New Democrat candidates 
peaked in 1988, a year in which the party believed (for a 
moment) that it had a realistic chance of replacing the Liber-
als as a major party in the system. With the collapse of the 
third party system in 1993 local New Democrat campaigns 
seem to been substantially weakened although this could 
also simply reflect a more systematic targeting of individual 
electoral districts. In either case, it does indicate a marked 
deterioration in the party’s position in national political 
competition over the period. 
With local campaign spending shrinking as a proportion 
of total allowable election expenditures, and local candidates 
spending as a proportion of their allowable limit also shrink-
ing, it is apparent that local candidate spending as a propor-
tion of all party spending has been in regular and steady 
decline over the past three decades. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3. A decade ago Carty Cross and Young (2000: 172) 
could confidently report that “close to 60 percent of all elec-
tion-period spending is done by candidates in local con-
tests”. By the 2008 general election that was no longer true 
and, as a new party system emerged, it appears that the 
campaigns of local candidates were consuming less than half 
of all partisan spending. While this has varied over time, and 
across parties, the change does appear to mark a distinctive 
break with the past and constitutes an important face of 
parties in the newly emerging party system.       
These broad patterns define the general character of the 
changes altering partisan competition, and the place of the 
local in it, over recent decades in Canada. But within this 
framework there has been a great deal of variation both 
within individual parties and across time. Figure 4 illustrates 
some of this using the standard deviation of the proportion 
of the limit spent by a party’s candidates as a measure of the 
internal variation in the strength of a party’s local campaigns 
in any given election. Here the story is not so straightfor-
ward. There has been a steady increase in the internal varia-
tion of local Liberal party campaigns that would appear to 
reflect (or possibly account for) their slow erosion as a genu-
ine national party.  
 
Figure 3. Local Candidate Spending as % Total Partisan Elec-
tion Expenditures 
 
By contrast, there was no such clear transformation in the 
New Democratic Party’s local campaign efforts. The extent of 
internal variation in them grew in the 1980s only to fall back 
at the turn of the century before recovering to essentially the 
same situation that characterized the party three decades 
earlier. The figure also demonstrates the enormous success 
of the Progressive Conservatives in the early years of the 
1974 election finance regime. The party quickly developed 
powerful fund-raising machines (Stanbury 1991; Carty 1991) 
that allowed them to mount strong campaigns in virtually 
every district (c.f. Fig 2), providing the basis for their great 
national victories of 1984 and 1988. The re-emergence of a 
viable and competitive conservative alternative after 2000 
surely rests in part on the new party’s capacity to shrink the 
variance in its local campaigns as it strengthens its presence 
in more districts. 
 
Figure 4. Variance in Parties’ Local Campaigns  
(SD of % limit spent) 
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Electoral contests in Quebec have always taken on a different 
hue as the parties have been forced to run distinctive cam-
paigns there, an imperative compounded by the emergence 
of the Bloc Quebecois in 1993 as the party with the largest 
support in federal elections in the province. Figure 5 traces 
the variance in the strength of the local Liberal and Bloc 
campaigns in Quebec over the last two decades. With the 
exception of the 2006 contest, it has been the Bloc that had 
the most unbalanced set of local campaigns, a consequence 
of its making comparatively little effort in the set of electoral 
districts with substantial Anglophone populations. If any-
thing, that variance appears to have grown over the party’s 
life as the Bloc simply focused on solidifying its base rather 
than attempting to expand its position in the system by 
contesting other electoral districts. 
 
Figure 5. Variance in Local Campaigns in Quebec 
(SD of % limit spent)  
 
The last three decades of electoral competition – both local 
and national – have seen the disintegration of one distinctive 
party system and the slow emergence of a new one. While 
that transformation reshaped party competition, it also 
altered the presence, organization and capacities of the 
individual parties that make up the system. In doing so it 
altered the ability of the parties to contest local electoral 
districts. During the third party system it was usual for all 
three national parties to run candidates in every district but 
then, from 1993 through 2000, only the Liberals managed to 
do so until the system restructured itself in (2004) a way 
that left the parties again contesting every seat (in the case of 
the Bloc in Quebec only). With distinctive roles in what was 
only nominally a national system of competition, the parties’ 
local profiles were shifting over time. 
 
The Liberals – the National Party? 
As the country’s “natural governing party” the Liberals had 
long been described as the only genuinely national party 
capable of a presence in virtually every part of the country. 
To maintain this status the party sought to mount viable 
local campaigns in as many electoral districts as possible. 
The result was that their candidates typically spent more 
than their opponents and that local campaigns were a more 
important part of the Liberal’s total campaign effort than 
was true of other parties (recall Fig 2 & 3). However the last 
three decades have seen a sustained erosion of the Liberals 
once easy dominance of Canadian politics, a process that 
flowed in part from its changed capacity to engage the grass-
roots. These changes had both a regional and temporal di-
mension but they also reflected the realities of power in a 
Westminster parliamentary system. 
Despite its claim to being a national party the Liberals 
have, for the past half-century, had a long-standing and 
distinctly regional tilt to their base that was characterized by 
a clear east-west gradient. The consistency of this greater 
strength in the east is obvious in Figure 6 that records the 
average campaign strength by province at the beginning, 
middle and end of the three decades. However the figure also 
reveals that over the period the party’s capacity to fight local 
campaigns was steadily being eroded. By 2006 not only were 
local campaigns able to spend less than they had a genera-
tion earlier but the interprovincial variation in local contests 
had grown, evidence of the breakdown of a consistent na-
tional campaign. 
 
Figure 6. Liberal Local Campaign Strength 
 
 
Some of this change in the Liberal party’s campaign capacity 
reflected the transformation of the wider party system that 
was signaled by the earthquake election of 1993. Figures 7a 
and b illustrate the differential strength of local Liberal 
district campaigns during the last years of the third party 
system, and then in its aftermath. They reveal that the re-
structuring of the system had a powerful effect on the place 
of the Liberal party in local electoral districts in national 
general elections. During the third system, while an east-
west gradient continued to mark the party’s local resources, 
Liberal partisans were generally able to mount significant 
campaigns all across the country in a predictable and regular 
way. That ended with the collapse of the system. Even 
though the party formed the government, Liberal district 
campaigns were left weaker and with greater variation, both 
from province to province as well as from election to elec-
tion. The Liberals were clearly less of a viably national party 
although, ironically, with less of an obvious east-west gradi-
ent to its campaign capacity.  
The Canadian practice of parliamentary government has 
traditionally given considerable advantages to a government 
party both institutionally (allowing it to pick election dates) 
and in terms of its ability to attract the resources necessary 
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to fight election campaigns. Thus we might expect to see 
some regular difference in party campaigns in terms of its 
position in the system at the time of the election. Parties in 
government ought to be able to organize a set of stronger 
campaigns in the constituencies. Figures 8a & b allow us to 
compare the strength and inter-provincial variation in Lib-
eral campaigns during elections in which they were the 
sitting majority government and those when they were in 
opposition.  
 
Figure 7a . Liberal Campaigns during Third party System 
 
 
Figure 7b. Liberal Campaigns Post Third party System 
 
They confirm our expectations. The party was able to run 
generally stronger campaigns when it enjoyed the ad-
vantages of office. By 2008, out of office and in a new sys-
tem, the inability of the Liberal party to run a balanced set of 
local campaigns indicated it was no longer the national force 
that had long dominated the nation’s politics. 
 
Figure 8a. Liberal Local Campaigns while in Office 
 
 
Figure 8b. Liberal Local Campaigns while in Opposition 
 
 
The New Democrats – a party of Western Protest? 
Long portrayed as a party of regional (western) protest the 
New Democrats have, in the past three decades, sought to 
emphasize their national campaign at the expense of those in 
local electoral districts. As a consequence it devoted an in-
creasingly larger share of its campaign resources to its na-
tional level campaign (Figs 1 & 3), saw the variance in local 
campaigns shrink (Fig 4) while, at the same time, the ability 
of its individual local candidates to spend to their legislated 
limit was falling (Fig 2). 
In Figure 9 we plot the average strength of the electoral 
district campaigns of NDP candidates by province over the 
three decades for which we have data. A west-east gradient 
that long characterized local NDP campaign capacity (rooted 
in the party’s origins on the inter-war prairies) has been 
eroded as its organizations in the western provinces became 
a pale reflection of what they had been in the 1970s: thus, in 
Saskatchewan, long the country’s social democratic heart-
land, NDP district campaigns were only half as strong in 
2006 as they had been in 1980. While the party still had 
virtually no presence on the ground in Quebec, its local 
campaigns in Nova Scotia were, by 2006, as well financed as 
those in Saskatchewan.  
 
Figure 9. NDP Local Campaign Strength 
 
 
In 1988 the New Democrats won a record number of seats in 
the House of Commons in an election in which their cam-
paign appeared to depend on a number of especially strong 
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local campaigns (Fig 9). Our portrait of the decades since 
suggests that the party was being transformed from one 
rooted in a set of strong electoral district associations capa-
ble of organizing strong local campaigns into a more broadly 
based national organization far more dependent on its na-
tional, as opposed to local, campaigns to win it seats.  
 
The Conservatives – a National Contender? 
For most of the twentieth century the conservatives were a 
party of opposition. This was a consequence of the party’s 
inability to sustain locally viable organizations in Quebec 
after the conscription crisis of 1917, and on the prairies until 
the realignment of the party system in the early 1960s. Ag-
gressive fund-raising prompted by the new election finance 
regime of the 1970s allowed the party to build a modern 
organizational infrastructure and enliven its local associa-
tions. As a result the party was able to contest both general 
elections of the 1980s with the best-financed local cam-
paigns (Fig 2 & 3) displacing the Liberals from office. 
The political marriage of Quebec francophones and 
Western francophobes that the Mulroney Progressive Con-
servatives put together in the 1980s proved unstable and its 
implosion proved the catalyst for the 1993 earthquake elec-
tion that broke the alignments that had governed the third 
party system. It left that 1980s conservative coalition in 
three pieces as the Bloc in Quebec, Reform in the west, with 
the old Progressive Conservative party holding the remain-
der.  And it was this fragmentation of party competition that 
allowed the Liberals to win three easy victories in a row 
despite the fact that their campaign organizations had also 
been disrupted by the system break (Fig 7). 
 
Figure 10 . Conservative Local Campaign Strength 
 
The western fragment, originating as Reform, began as a 
profoundly local organization but soon developed a more 
conventional local-national campaign balance as it morphed 
into the Canadian Alliance and determined to contest every 
district (see Fig 1). It wasn’t until 2004 that the Alliance and 
the old Progressive Conservatives managed to come together 
as a new Canadian Conservative party. In fact it had little 
local presence in Quebec, having lost most of its 1980s sup-
port to other parties – primarily the Bloc.  As Figure 10 
reveals, the party’s moved to quickly establish viable local 
campaign capacity in the province’s electoral districts which 
put it in a position to win minority governments in the sub-
sequent two general elections. By 2008, candidate expendi-
ture reports suggest that the Conservatives had the best-
financed set of local campaigns although this now appears to 
have reflected their newly adopted practice of using local 
allowance limits to cover what were essentially national 
campaign expenses.  
 
Local Campaigns in Contemporary Canadian 
Elections 
 
Strong local campaigns remain an essential part of national 
political parties’ electoral activity in Canada’s geographically 
based single member electoral system. Their management 
and financing by local activists perpetuates the place of the 
party on the ground in structuring electoral contests and 
reinforces the diversity that characterizes parties’ appeals. 
Yet some of the idiosyncrasy that Canadian parties’ organiza-
tional style has long permitted is now being challenged. 
The election finance regime itself is increasingly ad-
vantaging national as opposed to local party activity. It has 
increased the state reimbursement rates for national party 
activity and it presides over a continuing shift in the allowa-
ble limits – and hence spending – to the advantage of na-
tional as opposed to local campaigns.  The parties have re-
sponded to these incentives so that local spending as a pro-
portion of total partisan spending has now fallen below 50 
percent.  The Conservatives, pioneers in most party finance 
initiatives of the past forty years, have pushed the system 
further by developing institutional mechanisms that allowed 
its national campaign organization to cannibalize unused 
local spending space. Although the legalities of these practic-
es remain to be settled by the courts, they represent a further 
shrinking of the place and power of the local in national 
electoral campaigns. They also blur the very distinction 
between local and national campaign activity, threatening 
the function of separate legal limits for what may become 
indistinguishable activity. 
In this respect, we can see the effect of external institu-
tional factors – the election finance regime – on the funda-
mental local-national balance in Canadian electoral politics. 
But in other respects, we see little evidence that external 
factors are shaping the patterns within the parties. Although 
individual party practices governing the degree of internal 
variation in local spending have shifted there does not ap-
pear to be any discernible common pattern that affects all 
the parties. In particular the two major exogenous shocks do 
not appear to have had a visible effect: there were not 
marked increases in the internal variance in local spending 
in the aftermath of the 1993 deconstruction of the party 
system, nor do the 2004 election finance reforms appear to 
have had any immediate significant impacts on local elec-
tioneering. Rather, the parties’ electoral fortunes are reflect-
ed in (and perhaps driven by) their ability to spend at the 
local level.  
If the Liberal party could once legitimately claim to be 
Canada’s natural governing party –its national party– it can 
hardly do so now. Although the party was distinctly stronger 
236	   Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 6, No. 2-3, 2012, 227-236	  
and capable of running more vital local campaigns through 
much of the third party system, interprovincial differences 
have grown, and become more (temporally) irregular, since 
its collapse.  Sitting in opposition has also hurt the party’s 
capacity to maintain a viable local presence in many elec-
toral districts, inhibiting its ability to present itself as a genu-
inely national electoral force.1 With the Liberal party no 
longer anchoring the system as the constant in each district, 
something of the national has been effectively drained out of 
local choices.  The Conservatives are now attempting to 
replace this with a “garrison party” (Flanagan 2010) de-
signed to flood all the locals with centrally controlled cam-
paign material. This approach to nationalizing campaigns 
was once successfully used by the Conservatives in 1930 but 
collapsed under the pressure of financing it in subsequent 
elections (Glassford 1992). Whether the new party finance 
system has strengthened the national organization enough to 
withstand the loss of local money and personnel likely to 
flow from a highly centralized structure remains to be seen.   
The emergence of a new party system may be altering the 
local-national dynamics of electoral politics. In this new 
context the variance in individual parties’ capacity to mount 
local constituency campaigns is likely to increase as they 
respond to the realities of regional and national party system 
fragmentation. The consequence of central party organiza-
tions focusing on a limited number of local campaigns may 
lead to nominally national campaigns becoming carriers of 
the local imperatives that define the contests in their specifi-
cally targeted districts.  More than a century ago Siegfried 
reported that “local advantage” was one of “the arguments 
that tell” in Canadian elections. As a fourth party system 
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